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ABSTRACT
Hybrid warfare is a recently formed concept that focuses on the complexity of modern
conflicts and those in the future. After the Russian Federation annexed the Crimean
Peninsula in 2014, US and Western analysts started using the term hybrid warfare to
describe Moscow’s strategy. Analysts and policymakers are starting to consider the
approach and direction in Ukraine to be a new and unique type of warfare. This study
discusses the usefulness of the term hybrid warfare and examines two case studies that
reflect the characteristics of hybrid war, the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, to determine
if hybrid warfare is indeed unique to the post-9/11 security environment. Both case
studies have elements of hybrid warfare and involve complex military operations. Hybrid
threats are not new, and it is important that policymakers are aware of the ongoing
debates about the usefulness of the hybrid war concept before forming policies to counter
them. Ultimately, hybrid war as a concept has limited use to the policymaker, but it does
highlight the growing complexity of modern conflicts. The conflicts in Syria and Ukraine
involve an increasing blend of unconventional and conventional strategies and tactics. In
the future, the US will likely fight opponents that utilize a number of political, economic,
and cyber capabilities that the US has not had to face in previous conflicts.
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INTRODUCTION

“Hybrid warfare” and “hybrid challenges” are recently formed concepts used to
describe the characteristics of warfare in the current, post-9/11 geopolitical environment.
At the end of the Cold War, various academics and military organizations created
theories to understand and describe on-going conflicts and those that the US could be
expected to face in the future. Hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, compound warfare,
Fourth Generation warfare, unrestricted warfare, and low-intensity conflict are different
terms used to describe the conflicts that the US is currently engaged in, or are likely to
experience in the future. Many of these concepts were developed after the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks on the US and reflected the experiences of Western countries in the
War on Terror.
The concept of “hybrid warfare” was first defined by Frank Hoffman, a Research
Fellow at the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) at the Marine
Corps Combat Development Command. Hoffman described hybrid wars in his 2007
paper “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” as wars that “incorporate
a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular
tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and
criminal disorder.”1 According to Hoffman’s research, “hybrid wars” had the unique
characteristic of blurring the lines between different modes of war. Recent conflicts do
not replace or disregard previously established views on war, but do present new
challenges that US defense planning must address.
1

Frank Hoffman, “Conflict of the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” Potomac Institute for
Research Studies, (Arlington, VA, 2007), 14.
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Since Hoffman’s article, hybrid warfare has become part of the common
vernacular of the US Department of Defense. Other analysts, such as Nathan Freier, John
McCuen, Helmut Habermayer, and Christopher Bowers, have devoted academic research
to defining hybrid warfare and its effect on US strategic thinking.
US national security policy has already recognized that hybrid wars are a
challenge that needs to be addressed. Since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014,
government officials in the US and NATO have used hybrid war and its various forms to
describe Russia’s strategy in the region. During a speech in Berlin in July 2015, US
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter asked his audience, “How do we confront cyberattacks, propaganda campaigns and hybrid warfare?” The term was also featured in the
2015 US Nation Military Strategy, as well as a 2015 NATO Defence and Security
Committee Draft General Report. As hybrid warfare becomes part of common US and
Western strategic terminology, it is important to understand what the concept
encompasses and if it is indeed a new way to engage in conflict. It would appear that
future US defense policy may be influenced based on a concept that does not adequately
describe current security challenges.
The use of the term hybrid warfare is becoming more popular within the defense
community but is not accepted by all. In the view of some commentators, it is not a new
concept, rather just a buzzword to describe complex conflicts and the use of asymmetric
capabilities that is common throughout history. In the view of Dr. Damien Van Puyvelde,
an Assistant Professor of Security Studies and Associate Director of Research at the
National Security Studies Institute at the University of Texas at El Paso, “warfare,
whether it be ancient or modern, hybrid or not, is always complex and can hardly be
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subsumed into a single adjective.”2 Colin S. Gray, the director of the Centre for Strategic
Studies at the University of Reading, warns that creating different categories for
challenges, wars, strategies, and kinds of warfare are more likely to confuse than
enlighten.3 Divisions between analysts on the applicability of strategic concepts and
categories can be debated at another time, but the main challenge to the concept comes
from its similarity to other definitions of conflict.
US national security policy already recognizes that hybrid wars are a challenge
and need to be addressed. The 2015 US National Military Strategy highlights hybrid
conflicts as a distinct security challenge and illustrates the rising acceptance of the hybrid
war concept. Future US defense policy may be influenced based on a concept that does
not adequately describe current security challenges. Hoffman claims that recent conflicts
indicate a blending of various modes of conflict, thus indicating a new type of war that
challenges current US strategy and understanding of war.
There are numerous definitions of the hybrid warfare concept and the criterion for
what constitutes a hybrid war is not universally recognized by academics, governments,
and military organizations. It is important to recognize and examine how others view
hybrid warfare and how they differ from one another. This concept is still evolving, and
there may never be a universally accepted definition. Recognizing common
characteristics from the various definitions is useful for discussing the differences

2

Damien Van Puyvelde, “Hybrid war – does it even exist?,” NATO Review, May 7, 2015,
http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Also-in-2015/hybrid-modern-future-warfare-russiaukraine/EN/index.htm.
3

Colin S. Gray, Categorical Confusion?: The Strategic Implications of Recognizing Challenges
Either as Irregular or Traditional, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
2012), 16.
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between hybrid war and previously established concepts of war. Some of the previously
established theories will share similar characteristics with hybrid warfare, but at the
definitional level, the term does have distinctive features.
While hybrid war is a new and unique term, its usefulness to US defense
policymakers may be limited. US defense policymakers have acknowledged that hybrid
war will be a future challenge, but it will be difficult to create effective policies to
counter hybrid war when there is not even an agreed definition or criteria for the concept.
There is a risk of creating a dogmatic concept that does not reflect the realities in future
conflicts. Instead, the discussions of hybrid warfare illustrate how future wars will likely
be more complex and require changes in US defense strategies and policy.
Recent conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, which have been described was hybrid
wars, provide useful case studies for examining the complexity of conflicts in the post9/11 security environment. The case studies illustrate that there is a fundamental
difference between how current conflicts are fought today from those in the past. At an
operational and tactical level, government forces in Syria, and separatist fighters in
Ukraine are utilizing a combination of capabilities and strategies that present a new
challenge to the US. It is debatable whether or not hybrid warfare is the most effective
way to describe these threats, but the case studies show that the conflicts in Ukraine and
Syria are more complex than those in the past and represent new challenges for US
security policy.
Research for this thesis was conducted using a variety of sources. Due to the
ongoing nature of the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, most information was gathered from
secondary media, government, and think tank sources. In both cases, there is a significant

4

amount of propaganda from all sides and certain biases needed to be taken into account
when conducting research on these conflicts.

5

HYBRID WARFARE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

There are various definitions of hybrid war, but most appear to be derived from
Hoffman's works between 2006 and 2016. Hoffman's explanation of the concept is
widely cited within the academic community and will be used as the base definition for
this paper. However, Hoffman does not have a monopoly on the concept and other
academics and government publications offer different views on hybrid war. It is
important to acknowledge that there is no universally accepted definition of the concept
and to recognize that there are differences between the various definitions. What
academics in the United States view as hybrid war may not be the same as how US
military researchers or analysts in Europe see the concept. Different perspectives need to
be taken into consideration when analyzing a conflict or policy recommendations to
avoid confusion. Examining and comparing definitions from European governments,
think tanks, and analysts to those in the US provides a more complete understanding of
how others view the concept.
The Definitions Of Hybrid War
Hoffman is attributed with forming hybrid war, but other academics also provide
different definitions for the concept. Retired Colonel John J. McCuen describes hybrid
wars as
a combination of symmetric and asymmetric war in which intervening forces
conduct traditional military operations against enemy military forces and targets
while they must simultaneously—and more decisively—attempt to achieve

6

control of the combat zone’s indigenous populations by securing and stabilizing
them (stability operations).4

Like Hoffman, McCuen acknowledges that hybrid wars involve a combination of
symmetric (or conventional) and asymmetric capabilities. However, McCuen places a
greater focus on winning over control of the people within the battle space. The battle is
not just physical, but is “a wider struggle for control and support of the combat zone’s
indigenous population, the support of the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the
support of the international community.”5 It appears that McCuen believes that hybrid
wars require additional focus on winning the psychological battle, not just the physical
fight.
From the British perspective, there is a greater emphasis on the proliferation of
more sophisticated technology to irregular forces on the battlefield. In a white paper on
irregular warfare, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense notes that “hybrid warfare
is conducted by irregular forces that have access to the more sophisticated weapons and
systems normally fielded by regular forces,” and that “intervention forces will need to
confront a variety of threats that have in the past been associated primarily with the
regular Armed Forces of states.”6 The British view hybrid war to be more likely used by
an irregular force that has access to new technologies that counter traditional advantages

4

John J. McCuen, “Hybrid Wars,” Military Review 88, no. 2 (March 2008): 108,
http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.missouristate.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=31413987&site
=ehost-live&scope=site (accessed December 3, 2015).
5

McCuen, “Hybrid Wars,” 108.

6

Robert Wilkie, “Hybrid Warfare Something Old, Not New,” Air & Space Power Journal 23, no.
4 (Winter 2009): 14,
http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.missouristate.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=58495364&site
=ehost-live&scope=site (accessed December 3, 2015).
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by conventional militaries. Through this perspective, there is less of a chance that a state
conducts a hybrid war because it already has access to the advanced capabilities.
Within the US military, there is even a variance in how the concept should be
defined. According to the 2007 US maritime strategy “conflicts are increasingly
characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning
and execution, and non-state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies in
innovative ways.”7 Similar to the UK Defense Ministry’s definition, this early US
strategic view highlights the use of sophisticated technology used by non-state actors in
conventional and unconventional ways. The key characteristic from both definitions is
non-state actors have the capabilities of a conventional military but have the ability to use
them in a variety of different ways.
One of the most recent US military descriptions of hybrid war comes from the
2015 National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States. In the 2015 NMS, the US is
expected to become involved in “hybrid conflicts” comprised of “overlapping state and
non-state violence… where actors blend techniques, capabilities, and resources to achieve
their objective.”8 State and non-state actors may work towards shared objectives and
employ a wide range of weapons.9 The use of hybrid conflicts by aggressor states “serve
to increase ambiguity, complicate decision-making, and slow the coordination of
effective responses.”10 As in previous definitions, there is a focus on regular and irregular

7

Wilkie, “Hybrid Warfare Something Old, Not New,” 15.

8

Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015,
Department of Defense (June 2015): 4,
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf.
9

Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, 4.

10

Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, 4.
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forces cooperating to complete the same objectives and the proliferation of advanced
capabilities to the unconventional forces. The graphic below further illustrates how the
US military distinguishes a hybrid conflict from other forms (Figure 1).11

Figure 1. Continuum of Conflict according to the US Department of Defense12
Figure 1 shows how the Department of Defense defines a hybrid conflict and the
different military capabilities that may be employed. Compared to the previously
discussed definitions, the Department of Defense is focused on military operations, and
does not place an emphasis on the non-military capabilities that are included in other
definitions. The figure also recognizes that there is a new type of conflict that the US

11

Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, 4.

12

Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, 4.
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needs to prepare for, and it has a higher probability of occurring than direct military
action against another state in the future. Hybrid conflicts also have greater consequence
than non-state conflicts, indicating that military operations in the future are likely to be
hybrid and pose a greater risk to national security.
Hybrid warfare may also be a largely Western construct and influenced by the
recent and historical experiences of the US and European nations. Dmitry Adamsky, an
associate professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy at the
IDC Herzliya, argues that American, European, and Israeli combat operations in the
Middle East form the conceptual base and intellectual inspirations for creating the hybrid
warfare concept.13 Adamsky describes “military hybridity as a simultaneous employment
of conventional, sub-conventional, and possibly non-conventional warfare for the sake of
political objectives, or as the blurring of political and jihadi identities of the actors.”14
Unlike any of the other definitions, radical Islam is highlighted as part of the concept.
Focusing on Islam may be an attempt by the author to expand on their argument that
recent military conflicts in the Middle East have a disproportionate influence on Western
thinking.
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the US and its allies have been
conducting a global war on terror focused on defeating al-Qaeda and Islamist terrorism
and as a result, counter-terrorism dominates strategic thinking. US military and
government officials consistently rank terrorism as the greatest national security threat to
the country. After years of conducting counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism

13

Dmitry Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Coercion,” Proliferation Papers no. 54 (November 2015): 22,
http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp54adamsky.pdf (accessed December 3, 2015).
14

Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Coercion,” 22.
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operations targeting terrorist organizations, it is possible that these experiences have
heavily influenced the hybrid war concept. There is the risk that hybrid war is just a new
way to explain how radical Islamists conduct war rather than how future conflicts, in
general, will be fought.
Another useful framework comes from the International Institute for Strategic
Studies. In their 2015 edition of “The Military Balance” the publication defines hybrid
war as
the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign designed to
achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological as well as physical
advantages utilizing diplomatic means; sophisticated and rapid information,
electronic and cyber operations; covert and occasionally overt military and
intelligence action; and economic pressure.15
Again, there is the focus on using a variety of capabilities and tactics to achieve
objectives. What sets this definition apart is the inclusion of gaining a psychological
advantage and the use of economic pressure. Obtaining psychological advantages and
using economic pressures have been used throughout the history of warfare, but some of
the previous definitions have not specifically included them as characteristics of hybrid
war.
Russian military leaders also provide a useful perspective on the future of war that
matches many of the hybrid war definitions. Russia’s Chief of General Staff, Valery
Gerasimov, published an article in VPK in February 2013, which outlined his perspective
on future conflicts.16 Gerasimov said that future wars would emphasize “the broad use of
political, economic, information, humanitarian and other non-military measures, taken

15

“Complex Crises Call for Adaptable and Durable Capabilities,” The Military Balance
115:1 (2015): 5.
16
Michael Kofman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts,” War on the Rocks, March 11,
2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/.
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along with the use of the population's protest potential.”17 His comments are not a
definition of hybrid warfare, but it shares many of the same characteristics as the
previous definitions. Gerasimov focuses on the combined use of political, economic, and
information capabilities with military force.
Across the spectrum of academic and military analysts, there is a varying degree
of differences in defining hybrid warfare. Some focus on the use of advanced
technologies by irregular forces, others on winning the political battle as well as the
physical. Despite the variation in focus, there are themes that resonate throughout all of
the previously described definitions. Conventional and unconventional tactics and units
are used simultaneously to complete an objective or objectives that are political, military,
or both. There is a blending or blurring between the traditional state and non-state actors
and capabilities.

17

Leonid Bershidsky, “Moscow Strategists View World as War Theater,” Bloomberg, August 29,
2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-08-29/moscow-strategists-view-world-as-war-theater.
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HYBRID WAR’S NEW VIEW ON CONFLICT

Common Characteristics Of Hybrid War
Supporters of hybrid war argue that it is a new type of conflict that is different
from previously established concepts. The lack of a standard definition of what a hybrid
war is makes it difficult to compare it to other types of conflict. However, there are
several common characteristics that are found in most definitions of hybrid war.
Recognizing these similar themes is useful because it allows hybrid war to be compared
to the other concepts on war. The following characteristics represent the common themes
of the various definitions of hybrid war:
1) Simultaneous use of conventional and unconventional forces at the strategic,
operational, and tactical level;
2) Use of conventional and asymmetric tactics (including terrorism) and
operations;
3) Incorporation of non-military tools, such as electronic or cyber operations,
information campaigns, and economic pressure; and
4) Utilization of all capabilities within a battle space to achieve the objective(s).
While there is a growing acceptance of hybrid war as a legitimate concept to
describe conflict, it may not necessarily be new to the other views of war. Hybrid war
shares several key aspects with previously established concepts. Hoffman himself
acknowledges that hybrid wars are not new and that “the combination of irregular and
conventional force capabilities, either operationally or tactically integrated, is quite
challenging, but historically it is not necessarily a unique phenomenon.”18 In order to
determine if hybrid warfare is indeed a new concept, its definition will be compared to
other popular views on conflict.
18

Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Forces Quarterly 1st Quarter, no. 52
(2009): 36.
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Previously Established Concepts Of War
There are several concepts on war that share similar definitional themes or aspects
of hybrid warfare. They include: total war, low intensity conflict, asymmetric warfare,
Fourth Generation Warfare, unrestricted warfare, and compound warfare. The previously
listed concepts are not an exhaustive list of concepts of how wars are fought, but each
one can be related to hybrid warfare. Most of these concepts were established within the
past few decades to describe US operations outside of the traditional concept of war and
can be applied to recent military campaigns. However, hybrid war may be the most
accurate description of current security challenges.
Total war was one of the first concepts that recognized using a combination of
economic and military capabilities during wartime to defeat an adversary completely.
National economics are seen as a critical component of military success and are directly
linked to the armed forces. According to one commentator, there are “three distinct traits”
of total war: (1) interdependence between the armed forces and the productive forces of
the nation, which necessitates large-scale governmental planning; (2) the extension of
siege warfare enveloping the nation as a whole in both offensive and defensive actions;
and (3) a general vilification of the enemy nation.19 Total war also embraces the use of
psychological and economic warfare along with the use of traditional military power. 20
Before the establishment of the total war concept, war was seen as a fight between armed
forces that did not directly target population centers or the economy. The civilian

19

Hans Spier, “Class Structure and ‘Total War’,” American Sociological Review 4, no. 3 (1939):
371, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2084924 (accessed December 1, 2015).
20

Henry William Spiegel, “Wehrwirtschaft,” The American Economic Review 30, no. 4 (1940):
713, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1805064 (accessed December 1, 2015).
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population and the economy did suffer during conflict, but the ultimate objective was to
defeat the opponent’s military on the battlefield rather than the complete destruction of
their military and economic capabilities.
Several conflicts in the late 19th and early 20th centuries have been used as
examples of total war. The First World War is the most significant example of total war,
but the American Civil War and the Taiping Rebellion in China have also been described
as the precursor of World War I.21 In his memoirs after the American Civil War, Union
General William Tecumseh Sherman wrote that there were three tenants to total war: the
destruction of civilian property and supplies shortened the war by depriving Southern
armies of material support; depriving the Southern people of their spirit, and dousing
their enthusiasm for war; and “the idea of collective responsibility, the belief that
whatever happened, the South deserved it.”22 Sherman targeted any aspect of society that
would benefit the South and allow them to maintain their military campaign.
Total war shares some of the same aspects of the hybrid war concept, but
significant differences remain. Both theories embrace targeting anything that benefits the
enemy’s capability to fight. National industry and other capabilities that support the war
effort are legitimate targets. However, unlike in hybrid warfare, there is no mention of the
use of irregular forces or asymmetric tactics. Within the total war concept, only
conventional military forces are used during conflict.

21

Peter R. Moody, “Clausewitz and the Fading Dialectic of War,” World Politics 31, no. 3 (1979):
425, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009996 (accessed December 1, 2015).
22

Lance Janda, “Shutting the Gates of Mercy: The American Origins of Total War, 1860-1880,”
The Journal of Military History 29, no. 1 (1995): 16, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944362 (accessed
December 1, 2015).
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Low intensity conflict shares the irregular and unconventional characteristics with
hybrid war. In 1988, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff defined low intensity conflict as a
“political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional
war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states.”23 According to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, low intensity conflicts “are often localized, generally in the third world,
but contain regional and global security implications.”24 In another description, lowintensity conflict may involve “urban guerrilla wars, civil wars, separatist movements,
communal violence, insurrection, coups d'etat, and terrorism.”25 Low intensity conflict
has limited goals and intentionally avoids escalating to conventional military operations.
Hybrid war and low intensity conflict share the characteristics of the use of
irregular forces or terrorism. In low intensity conflict, there is a greater focus on
conducting unconventional operations and utilizing non-military capabilities such as
political, economic, and informational. However, low intensity conflicts differ from
hybrid war because its purpose is to avoid engaging in a conventional war. Hybrid wars
blend the conventional and unconventional while low intensity conflicts seek only to
engage in irregular operations.
Asymmetric warfare is closely related to low intensity conflicts. In an asymmetric
conflict, the opponent’s vulnerabilities are specifically targeted and operations “generally
seek a major psychological impact, such as shock or confusion that affects an opponent’s

23

Howard Lee Dixon, “Low Intensity Conflict Overview, Definitions and Policy Concerns,” ArmyAir Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (Langley AFB, VA, 1989), 23.
24

Dixon, “Low Intensity Conflict Overview, Definitions and Policy Concerns,” 23.

25

Richard H. Shultz, “The Low-Intensity Conflict Environment of the 1990s,” Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 517 (1991): 121, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1047190
(accessed December 1, 2015).
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initiative, freedom of action, or will.”26 The conflict will be between a stronger military
force and one far less capable, skilled or resourced. When one side recognizes that it
cannot compete at a traditional level, it could “adopt idiosyncratic technologies or
tactics.”27 In essence, the weaker actor refrains from conducting operations that allow the
stronger actor to use its capabilities that give it an overwhelming advantage. Instead of
engaging in set piece battles, one side will determine the weaknesses of the larger power
and exploit that weakness.
Low-intensity conflicts and asymmetric war share most of the same basic tenants.
Both concepts focus on a weaker actor fighting against a traditionally stronger power. In
an asymmetric conflict, the irregular force will not adopt a regular force structure or
conduct traditional military operations because it is at a significant disadvantage.
Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) builds on the asymmetric war concept of a
weaker actor bypassing the strengths of their opponent. According to Jason Vest, a senior
correspondent for The American Prospect who specializes in intelligence and national
security issues, the defining characteristics of 4GW are a “vast mismatch between the
resources and philosophies of the combatants” where operations focus “on bypassing an
opposing military force and striking directly at cultural, political, or population targets.”28
The main objective in 4GW is to use “all available networks-political, economic, social,
and military - to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals
26

David L. Buffaloe, “Defining Asymmetric Warfare,” The Land Warfare Papers no. 58
(September 2006): 12, https://www.ausa.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/ILW%20WebExclusivePubs/Land%20Warfare%20Papers/LWP_58.pdf.
27

Paul J. Dunne et al., “Managing Asymmetric Conflict,” Oxford Economic Papers 28, no. 2
(2006): 184, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3876996 (accessed December 1, 2015).
28

Jason Vest, “Fourth-Generation Warfare,” The Atlantic (December 2001),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/12/fourth-generation-warfare/302368/.
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are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.” 29 One side using
unconventional methods will use a variety of means to make their opponent capitulate to
political, rather than military, pressure. The main strategic effort may focus on attacking
more of the civilian base than the actual armed forces of the opponent if perceived as
more effective.
There are more similarities between 4GW and hybrid war than there are with
asymmetric warfare or low intensity conflict. Within the 4GW concept, there is a blurring
of lines between military and civilian targets and capabilities, with “success depending
heavily on effectiveness in joint operations as lines between responsibility and mission
become very blurred.30 While there still is the focus in 4GW of one combatant having
superior economic or military power, the concept acknowledges that there will be a
blurring between what is considered regular or irregular.
The unrestricted warfare concept comes even closer to the definition of hybrid
war. First proposed by two Chinese colonels in 1999, unrestricted warfare involves
“diverse, simultaneous, asymmetric attacks on an adversary's social, economic and
political systems.” 31 It includes “the employment of all lethal and non-lethal assets,
including armed and unarmed, military and nonmilitary force to compel the enemy to
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accept our interests.”32 Within the unrestricted warfare concept, any and all actions that
can contribute to victory should at least be considered. In essence, warfare no longer has
any rules and any part of the adversary’s military or society can be targeted.
This concept shares more similarities with hybrid war than any of the previous
concepts. It accepts that during conflict there will be a wide range of capabilities used and
may include using both conventional and unconventional assets. However, it is also
incredibly broad because anything and everything could fall under this definition. The
Chinese authors saw this as the next stage of warfare that will replace current theories on
conflict. Hoffman and other proponents of hybrid war do not believe that hybrid war will
replace other theories of war.
Compound warfare is perhaps the most similar concept to hybrid war. Thomas
Huber, a faculty member at the US Army Combat Studies Institute, writes that it is the
"the simultaneous use of a regular or main force and an irregular or guerrilla force against
an enemy.”33 Another description of compound warfare is when “separate or
complementary operations executed by regular and irregular forces are coordinated at the
strategic level; the simultaneous fight under a unified command and control, in order to
achieve a common objective.”34 Regular and irregular forces are used at the same time to
achieve the same goal. A single command and control center coordinates the efforts of
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both forces and gains the advantages of both conventional and unconventional
capabilities.
While compound warfare appears to be the same as hybrid war, there is a key
difference at the operational and tactical levels. In both concepts, the simultaneous use of
regular and irregular forces to complete a common objective is a defining feature.
However, in compound warfare, the coordination is limited to the strategic level.
Irregular units are used to support the conventional forces but in different areas of the
battle space rather than combining with them. Hybrid warfare features the fusion of
conventional and unconventional forces within the battle space.

Nature Of Past Conflicts Compared To Hybrid War
The previously discussed concepts of war do share similarities with the criteria of
hybrid war, but none share all four main characteristics. Table 1 illustrates the key
similarities and differences between the previously examined concepts of war to the
common characteristics of hybrid war. Each concept shares one or two key characteristics
but lacks other critical components, making hybrid warfare a unique and different type of
conflict. The four characteristics below were established for this thesis to highlight the
main components of the hybrid war concept.
1) Simultaneous use of conventional and unconventional forces at the strategic,
operational, and tactical level
2) Use of conventional and asymmetric tactics (including terrorism) and
operations
3) Incorporation of non-military tools, such as electronic or cyber operations,
information campaigns, and economic pressure\
4) Utilization of all capabilities within a battle space to achieve the objective(s)
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Table 1. Comparing other concepts of war to the four characteristics of hybrid war
Concept

Total War

Low Intensity Conflict

Asymmetric Warfare

Fourth Generation Warfare
(4GW)

Unrestricted Warfare

Compound Warfare

Key Similarities to Hybrid
War

Key Differences to Hybrid
War

Targeting economic
infrastructure
Using economic
capabilities

Limited use of asymmetric
tactics or unconventional
forces

Use of unconventional
forces and asymmetric
tactics
Use of information
warfare and propaganda

Little focus on combining
regular and irregular
forces
No use of conventional
tactics, limited goals

Use of terrorism,
unconventional forces and
tactics
Information warfare is
critical

No use of conventional
forces or tactics
No use of economic
capabilities

Combination of political,
economic, and military
capabilities
Use of conventional and
unconventional tactics

Focused on striking
civilian and economic
targets
Conventional and irregular
forces not completely
integrated

Combination of military,
political, and economic
capabilities
Use of conventional and
asymmetric tactics

Extremely broad and not
limited to a battlespace
Believed to replace all
other types of war in the
future

Simultaneous use of
regular and irregular
forces
Unified command and
control

Conventional and
unconventional forces do
not combine on the battle
space
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Each concept shares some of the key criteria for hybrid war, but fail to include all
four criteria. Total war and hybrid warfare both use economic and conventional
capabilities, but total war only uses limited asymmetric forces and tactics. Low intensity
conflicts place importance on asymmetric capabilities and the non-military measures like
information and propaganda campaigns, which are key criteria for hybrid warfare.
However, low intensity conflict intentionally avoids using conventional capabilities that
are required in hybrid wars. Asymmetric warfare, like low intensity conflict, focuses on
using irregular units but also lacks the use of conventional forces and tactics.
Fourth Generation Warfare, unrestricted warfare, and compound warfare appear
to have the most similarities to hybrid warfare. The combination of political, economic,
and military capabilities along with the use of conventional and unconventional forces are
all aspects of Fourth Generation Warfare, unrestricted warfare, and hybrid warfare.
Unrestricted warfare is incredibly broad and does not meet the criteria of all of the
capabilities being used in a single battle space. Fourth Generation Warfare, and
compound warfare, both fail to meet the hybrid warfare criteria of combining
conventional and unconventional forces within the battle space.
The hybrid warfare concept is not expected to become the only way actors will
wage war in the future. It will not replace asymmetric, compound, or low intensity
aspects in conflict situations, but it may be a more effective way to analyze current
conflicts. US policy is starting to acknowledge the hybrid war concept but has yet to
apply it to a conflict.
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The lack of a standard definition is one of the main challenges facing the
development of the hybrid warfare concept. There are competing perspectives on what
hybrid war is within the US and among Western allies, which can make cooperation
between governments more difficult if there are contrasting viewpoints. It is unlikely that
a universally accepted definition of hybrid war will be accepted by the US and its allies,
but establishing general criteria for what constitutes hybrid war would help provide the
framework for future security policies. If Western policymakers and militaries cannot
agree on the criteria for hybrid war, there is a risk of each country developing security
policies that do not fully address the current security challenges.
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THE COMPLEX CONFLICTS IN SYRIA AND UKRAINE

This section of the thesis argues that the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine are
different than past military operations and attempt to illustrate the complexity within the
battlespace. Military operations in both Syria and Ukraine share many of the
characteristics with the hybrid war concept. Regular forces are usually combined with
irregular units during major operations and a variety of conventional and unconventional
tactics are employed in the battlespace. Neither conflict fully falls within the hybrid war
concept, but both case studies provide examples of how modern military operations are
becoming more complex.

The Rise Of Conflict In Syria And Ukraine
The ongoing conflict in Syria has cost hundreds of thousands of lives and
destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure. There are numerous internal and external
actors that are either directly or indirectly involved in the fighting. Conventional and
irregular forces are fighting each other as well as terrorist organizations in a complex
environment. Within both the Syrian regime and opposition forces, there are multiple
motives for fighting along with conflicting objectives, adding further complications to
grasping a complete understanding of the conflict.
Syria’s current violence grew out of pro-democracy protests that were met with a
violent response by President Bashir al-Assad. Protests started in the southern city of
Deraa after teenagers were arrested and tortured for painting revolutionary slogans on a
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school wall.35 By July 2011, hundreds of thousands of citizens took to the streets
demanding Assad resign.36 The regime responded with increasing force against
demonstrators, causing opposition supporters “to take up arms, first to defend themselves
and later to expel security forces from their local areas.”37 According to the UN, by
August 2015 over 250,000 people have been killed due to the fighting.38 What started out
as political protests evolved into a multinational conflict that continues to draw in new
actors.
In a broad sense, there are three main groups of actors involved in military
campaigns in Syria, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), militias loyal the regime, and
international allies who provide support to Assad’s regime. Outside of the SAA, Assad’s
forces are augmented by Shia fighters from Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Russian
regular forces.39 Iran and Russia have also provided Assad with political and military
support since the protests started in 2011.40 As the conflict has progressed, the regime has
had to increase its dependency on direct support from its international allies.
The rise of Ukraine’s separatist forces in the eastern part of the country in 2014
also provides a useful case study for this discussion because it is frequently called a
hybrid conflict by the West. Russian soldiers are reportedly fighting directly with the
35

“Syria: The Story of Conflict,” BBC, Oct 9, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east26116868 (accessed December 4, 2015).
36

“Syria,” BBC, Oct 9, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868.

37

Ibid.

38

“Syria,” BBC, Oct 9, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868.

39

Kathy Gilsinan, “The Confused Person’s Guide to the Syrian Civil War,” The Atlantic, Oct 29,
2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/syrian-civil-war-guide-isis/410746/.
40

Gilsinan, “The Confused Person’s Guide to the Syrian Civil War,”
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/syrian-civil-war-guide-isis/410746/.

25

separatists, and entire Russian regular military units are also believed to be operating in
the country. On August 28, 2014, NATO released a series of satellite images that showed
Russian combat troops inside Ukraine.41 Despite numerous investigations and claims by
the West, Moscow categorically denies it has deployed Russian soldiers into eastern
Ukraine.
These conflicting claims present a challenge to analyzing the conflict. Moscow
and Kyiv are conducting significant information operations to send different messages to
the international community. Both sides are accusing the other of being the aggressor and
have a bias in their reporting. Like all conflict, the fighting is extremely emotional, and
some sources are designed only to present certain perspectives. Despite these challenges,
the conflict in Ukraine is important to analyze because it is already becoming the
embodiment of hybrid war.
Unlike the Syrian civil war, which typically focuses on military action, the
fighting in Ukraine provides a useful example of the incorporation of non-military tools,
such as electronic or cyber operations, information campaigns, and economic pressure, in
a modern conflict. Political instability throughout the country provides Russia with the
ability to put internal and external political pressure on Kyiv. The conflict in eastern
Ukraine grew out of a political revolution that started in 2013 known as the Maidan.
Massive protests against the pro-Russian government in Kyiv and other major cities
caused the president to flee the country.
During the political turmoil, Russia annexed the Crimea Peninsula, which likely
became the model for pro-Russian separatist movements in Ukraine. On April 7, 2014,
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protesters seized strategic buildings in the cities of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv. 42
Protesters were unable to hold Kharkiv, but unrecognized referendums held in Donetsk
and Luhansk (also known as the Donbas) on May 11 voted for independence. 43 That
same day, separatist leaders declared the formation of the Donetsk People’s Republic
(DNR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR). 44 However, unlike in Crimea, the
Kremlin did not welcome the DNR and LNR with open arms. Instead of moving to annex
the self-declared republics, Moscow called for caution and negotiations. 45
The hesitation by the Kremlin to accept the DRN and LNR into the Russian
Federation allowed Kyiv to organize itself politically and militarily. Presidential elections
held on May 25 in most of the country, except in the Donbas area, resulted in Petro
Poroshenko becoming the next president of the country46, who ordered the Armed Forces
of Ukraine to begin offensive operations against the separatists in June 2014.47 Referred
to as Anti-Terrorist Operations (ATO), Ukrainian forces quickly recovered larger cities in
the Donbas, including Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, and begin to encircle the city of
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Donetsk. 48 On June 25, the Russian Duma (Parliament) canceled its previous resolution
authorizing the use of Russian forces in Ukraine. 49
ATO forces continued their advance until mid-August 2014 when the situation on
the ground changed significantly. By August 19, the DRN and LNR lost three-fourths of
their originally claimed territory, until the introduction of substantial Russian military
equipment and regular forces. 50 According to a study conducted by the Atlantic Council,
an estimated 4,000 regular Russian soldiers crossed the border with tanks and quickly
halted the ATO advances. 51 Separatist forces, now bolstered by Russian troops, forced
the Ukrainian troops to retreat until a ceasefire was reached in Minsk, Belarus on
September 5, 2014. 52 ATO forces may have been able to break the separatist leaders’ will
before the middle of August, but after the deployment of Russian soldiers, the DNR and
LRN solidified their positions.
The ceasefire, known as the Minsk Agreement, was not to last. In many areas,
such as around the Donetsk Airport, fighting did not slow down.53 The conflict would
escalate until February 2015 when another ceasefire brokered by France and Germany
was signed once again in Minsk.54 Under the Minsk II agreement, separatists gained
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control of an additional 500 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and assurances by
Kyiv that political steps would be taken to recognize the DNR and LNR.55 As of this
writing, the Minsk II agreement is still in effect but the political aspects have yet to be
implemented, and separatist territory has not significantly expanded.

The Fusion Of Regular And Irregular Forces
One of the main characteristics of hybrid war, as well as the fighting in Syria and
Ukraine, is the combination of regular and irregular forces in military operations. In
Syria, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) is the conventional, state military controlled by the
Assad regime. At the start of the conflict, the SAA was the regime’s primary security
force, but as the opposition gain more territory and control, it needed to be augmented
with locally organized militias, an internationally recognized terrorist organization, and
Iranian and Russian forces. All of these different organizations work together, creating a
multifaceted force that can conduct a variety of operations and utilize the benefits of
conventional and unconventional tactics.
Irregulars Supporting Conventional SAA And Russian Forces. On paper, the
SAA at the beginning of the civil war was one of the most impressive militaries in the
Arab world. In 2011, the army had an estimated non-reserve strength of 220,000
soldiers.56 Many of the top commanders were trained by Soviet advisories and most units
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use Soviet-era equipment.57 However, once the protests evolved into open conflict, large
numbers of soldiers defected and the regime could not depend on the loyalty of
significant portions of the army. According to various sources, both from the opposition
and Western think tanks, an estimated 65,000 to 75,000 out of the 220,000 soldiers
remain loyal and dependable to the regime.58 Other estimates in 2014 put SAA numbers
at around 150,000, almost half of its pre-war strength.59 Mass desertions significantly
affected the regime’s ability to hold and defend territory from the opposition and the
Islamic State. After losing almost half of its manpower, and unable to trust some of the
soldiers that remain, the regime turned to irregular forces from both internal and external
sources.
The National Defense Forces (NDF) were originally created as neighborhood
militias to protect the regime and maintain the status quo in Syria and their specific
towns. While the militias support Assad, they also have their local interests that may
contradict the strategy of the government.60 These groups operate in a similar manner as
the Popular Committee militias in Iraq and are located throughout most of Syria.61
Volunteers continue to join the NDF and form a significant irregular capability for
Assad. Recent estimates put the NDF at a total strength between 60,000 to 100,000
57
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fighters.62 The regime started formalizing and professionalizing the militias in 2013,
when it created the NDF, to fully utilize their capabilities.63 Once integrated into the
government’s defense structure, the NDF started to receive better weapons and training
from the Syrian military.64 Before the formalization of relations between the regime and
the militias, it is believed that Iran and Hezbollah provided training and equipment for
many of the groups.65 Many of the NDF units started out as proxies for Iran in its effort to
prevent Assad from being overthrown.66 As a result, the training the militias received
focused on asymmetrical, urban, and guerrilla warfare, types of war that the SAA was
unprepared to fight.67 The NDF provides additional forces for the regime that are
dependable, adequately trained, and are prepare to fight in a similar manner as the
opposition.
Iran is also suspected of being deeply involved in not only training local
paramilitaries but providing the regime with its forces and foreign fighters. Like the
NDF, these irregular units augment the SAA throughout the country and provided
additional reserves for offensive operations. Iranian soldiers also provide training and
intelligence for the regime. It appears that Iran is becoming more involved in military
operations in Syria and their support for Assad shows no sign of dropping off.
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Most of the Iranian influence in Syria comes from the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps- Quds Force (IRGC-QF). The US first acknowledged that the IRGC-QF
was actively training paramilitaries in Syria in August 2012 and were forming a militia
called the Jaysh al-Sha‘bi.68 It is unknown how many IRGC-QF commanders are
operating in Syria, but the numbers range from 60 to 70 to "a few hundred".69 However,
it is known that the leader of the IRGC-QF, Qassem Suleimani, is in Syria and most
likely leading operations there.70
Open-source information does not provide many details into the complete extent
of the IRGC-QF involvement in Syria, but Iranian forces are now participating in direct
combat operations. Since 2013, there have been "157 IRGC members killed in combat in
Syria, including Brigadier General Hossein Hamadani (the most senior IRGC commander
killed in Syria), General Hamid Mokhtarband (head of an armored brigade combat team)
and his chief of staff Farshad Hassounizadeh.”71 If recent estimates put Iranian advisors
at most “around a few hundred”, then the IRGC has suffered heavy casualties in recent
years while fighting in Syria. Regardless of the number of commanders, the IRGC-QF
has deployed to the region; it is important to recognize that Iran is directly involved in the
military operations.
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Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon further support regime forces and plays a
similar role as Iran in Syria, providing advisors and leaders for militias and irregular
forces throughout eastern Syria. Its involvement in the civil war has evolved and
expanded with the rise of the Islamic State (IS) and pressure on the regime. Hezbollah
deployments remain near the Lebanese border and the western areas of Syria.
Unlike the IRGC, Hezbollah’s involvement started out as both a training and
combat mission. Its forces operate alongside both Iranian and NDF troops, providing key
leadership capabilities for pro-regime militias.72 The first major deployment of militants
occurred on June 12, 2014, two days after the fall of Mosul to IS.73 According to a 2014
assessment by Israeli military officials, around 4,000 to 5,000 Hezbollah fighters are sent
to Damascus, Qalamoun, Homs, Latakia, Aleppo, and southern Syria on a rotational
basis.74 Hezbollah is largely limited to regions along or near the Lebanese border but
does participate in regular combat operations.
Similarly, to Iran, Hezbollah's role in the conflict has increased over the years.
Currently, there is an estimated 6,000 to 8,000 fighters deployed to Syria, at least 1,000
more than in 2014.75 In the past two years, Hezbollah has created two new commands,
one on the Lebanon-Syrian border and another within Syria.76 According to one analyst,
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by 2015 Hezbollah was suffering 60 to 80 casualties a week in just the Qalamoun
region.77 Hezbollah’s increasing number of troop deployments and casualty rate indicates
that the group is dedicated to the fight in Syria and intends to maintain its presence within
the country. Assad’s regime can continue to depend on Hezbollah for support in its
military operations throughout western Syria. The NDF, IRGC, and Hezbollah all provide
regime forces with additional unconventional soldiers for a variety of operations.
Russia's current involvement in Syria has been in direct air support for the SAA
and irregular forces throughout the country. The air campaign began on September 30,
2015, and according to the US State Department, "90 percent of Russian airstrikes
targeted Syrian rebel positions rather than ISIS or Jabhat al-Nusra during the first
week.”78 Russian planes mainly fly out of the Bassel al-Assad International Airport near
the port city of Latakia, with some helicopter gunships operating out of bases in Hama,
Sharyat, and Tiyas.79 Overall, the Russian forces contain up to 34 combat aircraft
including advanced jets and attack helicopters.80
Recent troop movements in Homs may indicate that Russia plans to expand its
presence in Syria. According to a local human rights organization, the Russians are
“building new runways at the Shaayrat airport and reinforcing its surroundings in order to
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use it soon for operations."81 A local media source reported that the Shaayrat airbase has
around 45 fortified airplane hangars and two runways.82 If these claims are true, Moscow
may be planning to send additional aircraft or shift already deployed assets to the
Shaayrat airbase. New deployments will provide regime forces in central Syria more
effective air capabilities for future operations. It also illustrates Russia’s resolve in the
conflict and its willingness to commit significant forces to the fight in Syria.
Ukraine’s Irregular Separatists And Covert Russian Support. In Syria, the
SAA is overtly supported by the NDF, IRQC, Hezbollah, and Russia. Ukrainian
separatists operate within a more covert environment. In eastern Ukraine, the separatists
are largely an irregular force that grew out of anti-Maidan sentiments and the desire to
remain politically close to Moscow. It was only after the ATO started making significant
gains against the DNR and LNR that Russia covertly deployed regular forces into the
region. The governments in Damascus and Kyiv both have to fight irregular opponents,
however, in Ukraine the separatists are directly augmented with foreign regular forces
rather than the government.
Since their formation, the separatists have benefited from having access to
Ukrainian and Russian military equipment. Open source investigations have shown that
over time Russia has sent more sophisticated and advanced weapon systems into the
Donbas.83 Ukrainian airpower was quickly negated due to the effective use of manportable, shoulder-fired air defense systems (MANPADS), and advanced radar-guided
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surface-to-air missiles.84 Separatists are also equipped with Main Battle Tanks (MBTs),
specifically T-72s and T-64s, along with multiple rocket launch systems (MLRS), such as
the BM-21 “Grad”.85 Along with access to assorted small arms and support weapons,
separatist forces either match Ukrainian military capabilities or at times, surpass them.
Not only do the DNR and LNR have a general parity in military capability with
Ukrainian forces, but they also have similar overall force strengths. According to
estimates from Kyiv, there are approximately 36,000 Russian and separatist fighters in
the Donbas, compared to the 34,000 Ukrainian soldiers along the line of contact.86 The
separatist numerical advantage alone makes it incredibly difficult for Kyiv to launch
successful offensive operations against entrenched and hardened separatist positions.
The DNR claims to have consolidated its forces under the control of its Ministry
of Defense and are coordinated through its unified command. Various militia groups are
now all working together as the Army of the DNR, rather than armed gang only
subordinate to their leader. Most of the independent militias now operate as the 1st Army
Corps, under the Department of Defense of the Donetsk People’s Republic.87 The 1st
Army Corps originally formed out of several of the major independent units such as the
Slavyansk Brigade, Oplot, Kalmius, and others.88 In September 2015, parts of the
Republic Guard, another conglomerate of smaller groups, also joined the 1st Army
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Corps.89 Over time, the DNR has tried to force all of the militias to at least appear to fight
under one banner, rather than as a group of allied, but independent units.
One of the most famous units in the DNR forces, and possibly the most effective,
is the Sparta Battalion. The group, led by Arsney Pavlov (who goes by the nom de guerre
Motorola), has reportedly fought in some of the fiercest battles throughout the conflict. 90
An estimated 150-200 men fight in the unit.91 Its fighters took part in the operations at
Ilovaisk92 and the Donetsk Airport.93 Sparta Battalion is an infantry unit and is meant to
operate in a conventional capacity.
Another conventional, and heavily armed, DNR battalion is believed to be from
Chechnya. The Vostok (East) Battalion arrived in May 2014 and established their
headquarters in Donetsk.94 Fighters in the Vostok Battalion come from Chechnya, South
and North Ossetia, and Russia.95 It is also particularly well-armed, having been seen with
surface-to-air missiles, 30mm automatic grenade launchers, heavy machine guns, and
anti-tank weapons separatist leaders claim they took from a Ukrainian military base. 96

89

Fedotov, “On the Reorganization of the Army of the DPR.”

90

Jambul Tsulaia, “Real Talk With Russia's Fake Super Soldier,” The Daily Beast, March 29,
2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/03/29/real-talk-with-russia-s-fake-super-soldier.html.
91

Vyacheslav Hrypun, “Кто с кем воюет на Донбассе в октябре,” [Translated from Ukrainian]
Insider, October 22, 2014, http://www.theinsider.ua/politics/544551695677e/.
92

Lucian Kim, “Massacre at Ilovaisk,” Newsweek Global 169, no. 19 (2014), 45.

93

Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, “Ukraine Live Day 335: The Battle for Donetsk,” Interpreter
Magazine, January 18, 2015, http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-live-day-335-the-battle-for-donetsk/.
94

Claire Bigg, “Vostok Battalion, A Powerful New Player In Eastern Ukraine,” RFERL, May 30,
2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/vostok-battalion-a-powerful-new-player-in-easternukraine/25404785.html.
95

Gabriela Baczynska, “More foreign fighters break cover among Ukraine separatists,” Reuters,
June 1, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-vostok-idUSKBN0EC1LL20140601.

37

The amount of foreign fighters within the unit, and its advanced weaponry makes it more
unique among the separatist forces.
Many of the pro-Russian militias are designed to be conventional infantry units.
However, some of the groups also have mechanized capabilities. One such unit is the
Oplot (which means “stronghold” in Russian) Battalion, commanded by Aleksandr
Zakharchenko, the current prime minister of the self-declared DNR.97 The group is
equipped with several Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), which may have come from Russia.98
Oplot Battalion also has Grad MLRS deployed around the city of Donetsk. 99 Unlike the
infantry-based Sparta Battalion, Oplot is more of an armored unit that supports other
separatist groups.
Volunteer units in the DNR are also significantly diverse in the number of fighters
who join them. Some groups have between 1500 and 300 fighters, but others can number
in the thousands. The Russian Orthodox Army, led by former Russian intelligence officer
Igor Strelkov (real last name Girkin), is believed to have up to 4,000 members.100 It has
participated in operations around the Donetsk Airport and may have shot down a
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Ukrainian military helicopter.101 According to members of the unit, around 20 percent of
the fighters are Russian, and the other 80 percent are local volunteers.102 It is an infantry
unit and is not known to have significant armored or artillery capabilities.
Some of the volunteer groups in the LNR have joined to form larger and more
formal military units. One of the first units to combine smaller separatist militias under
one name is the Army of the South-East, or South-East Army, which formed in Luhansk
on April 6, 2014.103 Originally led by Alexey Mozgrovi, it has several thousand members
from around a dozen smaller battalions.104 In December 2014, the unit was renamed the
Corps of the People’s Militia under the command of Major-General Sergei Ignatov.105
Creating the Corps of the People’s Militia is an attempt by the separatist government in
Luhansk to bring the militias under a more unified command, similarly to the DNR’s 1st
Army Corps.The Zarya (“Dawn”) artillery brigade, which was created and led by current
LNR president Igor Plotnytski, joined the official LNR military structure after its
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creation.106 One of the oldest and most well-equipped militias, the Dawn Brigade has
around 1,000 men.107
Ukrainian forces not only have to fight against the irregular volunteer separatist
forces but also against professional, conventional Russian military forces equipped with
superior weaponry and capabilities. Many of these units are sent to bases near Russia’s
border with Ukraine then cross over the border.108 A variety of Russian soldiers are
believed to be operating with the separatists, including special forces of both the GRU
(Russian military intelligence) and the Federal Security Service (FSB, the successor to
the KGB).109
Moscow denies any direct military involvement in Donetsk or Luhansk oblast.
The Kremlin also claims that it has not provided advanced military equipment to
separatist forces in the Donbas. Both NATO and independent analysts have challenged
Russia’s denials of its direct involvement in the fighting in eastern Ukraine.110 In
response to the accusations from the West, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has
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challenged Kyiv to present facts that Russia is sending military equipment to the
separatists, and said that “before demanding from us that we stop doing something,
please present proof that we have done it."111 Moscow can counter these allegations
because the forces it has deployed across the border often operate without insignia.
Since the summer of 2014, Russia has redeployed various troop formation to the
Ukrainian border. Some of the units include the “20th, 58th and 41st Armies, and the
76th VDV (Airborne) Division, which participated in Georgia in 2008.”112 In March
2015, US Army Europe Commander Ben Hodges estimated that twelve thousand Russian
soldiers, including “military advisers, weapons operators, and combat troops” are active
in eastern Ukraine.113 NATO estimates from January 2015 place between 250 to 1000
GRU officers in eastern Ukraine that advise and assist separatist forces as well as operate
sophisticated weapons systems.114
The introduction of advanced MBTs from Russia, either operated by pro-Russian
or regular Russian soldiers, have had a significant impact on the fighting. According to
Aleksandr Zakharchenko, the leader of the DNR, Russian reinforcements in August 2014
including “150 units of combat armor, including about 30 tanks - the rest were AIFVs
(Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles) and APCs… were inserted here at the most critical
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moment."115 Throughout the conflict, armored forces provided by Moscow have been
critical in major victories against the ATO forces. Despite the importance of these forces,
the Kremlin continues to deny they are operating in the Donbas.

Joint Regular And Irregular Operations In Syria And Ukraine
Hybrid war involves not just regular and irregular soldiers fighting the same
enemy. What separates hybrid war from other concepts is when all of these different
capabilities are coordinating their operations to achieve the same objective, in the same
battle space. This creates an environment where it is impossible to independently target
the irregular from the regular forces during combat. The joint forces in Syria and Ukraine
previously described have conducted numerous significant operations that illustrate this
complexity in modern conflict.
In Syria, almost all major regime operations involve the SAA operating with at
least one other irregular force that has been previously described. These combined forces
operate across all of the regime’s fronts. In October 2015, a senior Iraqi politician
announced that a joint information center between Iraq, Syria, Russia, and Iran was
established in Iraq.116 Another joint operations room was reportedly established in
Damascus following talks in Moscow.117 Regions in the north, particularly in Latakia,
Aleppo, and Idlib provinces provide the best examples of joint operations. One video
posted online showed the leader of the IRGC-QF Qassem Suleimani addressing Iranian
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military officers and Hezbollah fighters in Latakia.118 During a television interview on
September 22, 2016, IRGC Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi said that during
operations, Russia provides the aerial support for the ground units, which Safavi
describes as “the Syrian army, Syrian popular forces, and some advisory forces and/or
Hezbollah forces.”119 Safavi also said that the on-the-ground intelligence collection for
the airstrikes is conducted by units under the supervision of IRGC or Hezbollah
operatives.120
A major offensive in Aleppo Province provides an example of the conventional
SAA conducting a joint operation with the irregular IRGC. On October 15, 2015, the
regime launched an offensive to strengthen its foothold in Aleppo city.121 SAA forces,
with Iranian proxy fighters, ended the multiyear siege of the Kuweires Airbase east of
Aleppo City.122 At the same time, additional SAA units supported by both Russian
airstrikes and “2,000 Iranian, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shi’a militia fighters" assaulted
opposition-controlled villages south of Aleppo City.123 According to opposition forces,
Russian personnel also participated in the attack and “directly supervised the operation
118
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via a joint Russian-Iranian operations room.”124 The October 2015 Aleppo offensive is an
example of a conventional force (the SAA) augmented by irregular forces (IRGC,
Hezbollah) conducting an assault supported by a third additional actor (Russian aircraft)
within the same battle space.
A similar offense occurred in Idlib Province in October 2015. During an offensive
in early October, two Hezbollah commanders were reportedly killed fighting with regime
forces near Idlib.125 The assault started on October 11, 2015, when regime forces
supported by Hezbollah fighters and Russian air power, attempted to cut off the
opposition in Idlib.126 The fact that two Hezbollah commanders died in the fighting
indicates that the group is directly involved combat and is not taking an ancillary role.
Operations conducted by pro-regime forces in the southern provinces of
Qalamoun and Derra are similar to those in northern and central Syria. Hezbollah
fighters, along with Iranian proxies and regime forces, began to retake strategic ground
throughout the mountain range in Qalamoun in 2013.127 By March 2014, Syrian forces
reported that they had taken the last opposition stronghold in the Qalamoun Mountains at
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Yabroud.128 After losing territory to the opposition in early 2015, the regime and
Hezbollah reported regaining “control of 300 square kilometers in the region” in May
2015.129 All three operations involved a combination of the SAA and Hezbollah
coordinating their efforts to retake and control territory throughout Qalamoun but did not
involve asymmetric tactics.
In Deraa Province, Assad's forces work directly with Iranian soldiers and
Hezbollah. An offensive launched on February 3, 2015, in northwestern Derra was
reportedly preceded by IRGC and Hezbollah activity in the region, including sleeper-cell
operations.130 On February 10th, “approximately 5,000 Syrian soldiers, Hezbollah
fighters, and Iranian militiamen seized several towns and hills in northern Dera’a
Province, including Deir al-Adas and Deir al-Makir, following the launch of a regime
offensive on February 9.”131 The Syrian Defense Minister and IRGC-QR commander
Qassem Suleimani reportedly visited the frontlines during the operation.132 Suleimani’s
presence suggests a high level of command and control coordination between Syrian and
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Iranian leaders to launch a successful joint offensive that captured territory from the
opposition.
Separatist offensives in Ukraine, backed by Russian forces, also provide useful
examples of joint operations. The Ukrainian defeat at Ilovaisk in 2014 marks the turning
point of the initial conflict and the first significant use of regular Russian soldiers in the
Donbas. Prior to the battle at Ilovaisk in Donetsk oblast, the separatist forces were being
pushed back and rapidly losing ground to the ATO.133 Fighting in Ilovaisk started on
August 18 when Ukrainian soldiers started an operation to seize the town to cut a rail line
to Russia and separate the DNR and LNR stronghold.134 ATO soldiers occupied half the
town while conducting fierce close-quarters combat with separatists in the town.135 The
regular Ukrainian soldiers were bolstered with the volunteer Dnipro and Donbas
battalions but were not able to evict the separatist forces from Ilovaisk. 136
In less than a week, the ATO forces faced total encirclement and annihilation.
Starting on August 23, separatist artillery and rockets from Grad MLRS started to land
around the ATO positions.137 On August 29, ATO forces started to withdraw after
believing that they had secured safe passage through a corridor out of the town, but where
attacked as they left the area. 138 The massive losses at Ilovaisk shocked Kyiv. An
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official study conducted by the military prosecutors announced the official death toll at
366.139 It took President Poroshenko four days to acknowledge the defeat publicly. 140
DNR soldiers in the town and the surrounding area, most likely backed by Russian
regulars, were able to stop the ATO advance into the town and start to envelop their
flanks. During the fighting in Ilovaisk, the Ukrainian forces captured a T-72 before
retreating from the town, just one example of Russian tanks being deployed to support
separatist operations.141 The separatists formed a cauldron, a Soviet-era term for a full
encirclement, around the Ukrainian soldiers and then destroyed them as they attempted to
leave the cauldron.142
Throughout most of the conflict, major Ukrainian defeats occurred when the
separatists were able to isolate and encircle the ATO forces. The offensive against
Ukrainian soldiers in Debaltseve also involved pro-Russian forces forming a cauldron
around the ATO position, backed by Russian armor.143 Separatist forces slowly started to
push towards Debaltseve in early January 2015. The town of Debaltseve sits on a
strategic railway hub that connects Donetsk to Luhansk and Russia.144 Starting in late
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January 2015, pro-Russian armored units started engaging Ukrainian forces outside the
town.145 On January 23-24, separatists seized the villages of Troitskoye and Svtlodarsk,
located near the M-103 highway that connects Debaltseve to the Ukrainian stronghold at
Artemivsk.146 Initial maneuvers by the pro-Russian forces intended to isolate and
eventually surround the ATO soldiers in Debaltseve and force a surrender.
The unique location of Debaltseve allowed the DNR and LNR to launch a
significant combined operation to capture the city. Initial attempts to move on the village
from the southwest in Donetsk oblast by the DNR did not achieve significant results.147
To the east, LNR units started to make progress and on February 10, the village of
Logvinovo, also located along the M103 highway and northeast of Debaltseve, fell to
separatists.148 By February 10, the Ukrainian forces were effectively caught in another
cauldron. The M103 highway, the most effective means of escape or resupply, was
threatened on both sides.
Ukrainian forces tried to hold out as long as possible but decided to withdraw
instead of losing thousands of troops in the town. The order to retreat came days after the
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signing of the Minsk II ceasefire on February 14, 2015.149 On February 18, ATO forces
started to retreat from Debaltseve, and similarly to Ilovaisk; separatist forces opened fired
on the convoys with artillery and tanks.150 Using effective combined arms of infantry,
artillery, and tanks, the DNR and LNR units conducted a joint encirclement operation and
delivered a crushing blow to Kyiv. Separatist fighters admitted after the Battle of
Debaltseve that Russian tanks had been decisive in winning the fight.151 According to
Kyiv, 66 Ukrainian soldiers were killed and 300 hundred wounded while DNR claimed
that the Ukrainians suffered over 3,000 killed during the battle.152 It is likely that both
sides altered the numbers to support their narrative, but it is sufficient to say that the ATO
suffered significant casualties and an embarrassing retreat.
At both Ilovaisk and Debaltseve, DNR and LNR forces were able to overpower
and outmaneuver the ATO. These successes are largely due to the support provided by
Russian forces operating alongside the separatists. According to Aleksandr
Zakharchenko, the leader of the DNR, Russian reinforcements in August 2014 including
“150 units of combat armor, including about 30 tanks - the rest were AIFVs (Armored
Infantry Fighting Vehicles) and APCs… were inserted here at the most critical
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moment."153 The introduction of regular Russian armored unit halted the ATO advance
and allowed the encirclement of Ilovaisk. Russian tanks at Debaltseve provided the same
advantage for the separatists, all while Moscow denied any direct involvement in the
fighting.

Asymmetric Tactics Used By The Syrian Regime And Ukrainian Separatists
Supporters of the hybrid war concept argue that another unique characteristic of
the concept is the use of both conventional and asymmetric tactics and operations by the
joint forces. Asymmetric tactics range from using irregular forces to infiltrate cities to
terrorist operations. The Syrian regime utilizes the capabilities of its irregular forces to
mount a variety of asymmetric operations against the opposition, including infiltrations,
kidnappings, and the use of barrel bombs. Separatists in Ukraine have launched a number
of bombing campaigns in major cities controlled by the government, and Russia is
suspected of being behind significant electronic warfare operations. These asymmetric
capabilities are sometimes used in support of major operations or to generally weaken the
resolve of the opponent.
Fighting around al-Qusayr, Homs province, provides a useful example of regime
forces using asymmetric tactics. In April 2013, a coordinated effort between the SAA and
Hezbollah forced the opposition into al-Qusayr and isolated them in the city. 154 Regime
forces combined with Hezbollah fighters and the NDF assault al-Qusayr in early May
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2013, supported by regime artillery and air support.155 During the attack, the irregular
forces infiltrated the city before armored-supported units moved in to secure it.156 The
capture of al-Qusayr involved Hezbollah fighters launching the main assault while being
directly supported by SAA artillery and airstrikes.157 NDF and Hezbollah units were able
to launch a successful, asymmetric infiltration mission into the city to help neutralize
defensive positions before SAA armored units conducted the conventional main assault.
A joint offensive in Quenitra Province in March 2015 also involved irregular
operations. Regime forces along with IRGC and Shia militias “launched a violent attack
on all towns and villages in the northern countryside of Daraa, the countryside of
Quneitra and the liberated villages in the western countryside of Damascus.”158 Part of
the attack involved heavy rocket, artillery, and air strikes along with the use of barrel
bombs.159 In mid-October “the Syrian army, Hezbollah reinforcements, and local militias
loyal to the regime” held back an opposition offensive, with Hezbollah reportedly
contributing over 500 fighters to the defense.160
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The fighting in Quneitra illustrates the ability of the regime to use combined
regular and irregular forces and the use of conventional and asymmetric operations or
tactics. Regular SAA units combined with the irregular IRGC and Hezbollah forces to
conducted offensive and defensive operations. During those operations, the combined
pro-regime forces used conventional tactics along with the asymmetrical tactical use of
barrel bombs.
After losing much of the countryside in northern Syria in 2013, pro-regime
militias allegedly “kidnapped hundreds of civilians from rebel-controlled villages around
Idlib city.”161 Kidnapping civilians allow the regime to disrupt opposition plans without
having to devote forces to the battlefield. According to the UN Human Rights Council in
2014, “government forces continued to perpetrate massacres and conduct widespread
attacks on civilians, systematically committing murder, torture, rape and enforced
disappearance amounting to crimes against humanity.”162 In the same report, it is noted
that "indiscriminate and disproportionate aerial bombardment and shelling led to mass
civilian casualties and spread terror.”163 The SAA and regime allies have used terrorism
as a deliberate tactic in an attempt to force the civilian population to support the
government and to combat the opposition.
Assad’s regime has also used chemical weapons against both civilian and
opposition targets throughout the country. One Human Rights Watch report notes that
“Syrian government forces used toxic chemicals in several barrel bomb attacks in Idlib
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governorate between March 16 and 31, 2015.”164 Human Rights Watch investigated a
sarin gas attack in the Damascus suburbs on August 21, 2013, and determined that the
evidence strongly suggested that the Syrian government conducted the attack.165 The
deadliest attack occurred on August 21, 2013, in Ghouta, when in a single chemical
attack more than 5,000 people were affected and around 1,500 were killed.166 While the
use of chemical weapons against civilians or in a conflict is not a new phenomenon in
war, it illustrates the regime’s deliberate use of asymmetric capabilities to further their
military objectives in the civil war.
Throughout the conflict, the regime has depended on air power to protect itself
and to strike opposition positions. Barrel bombs have become a standard tool in the
regime arsenal to cut costs and expand the use of its air fleet.167 Essentially, barrel bombs
are barrels filled with explosives dropped from planes or helicopters. They are highly
imprecise and are indiscriminately used by the regime in areas with high population
density where opposition fighters are.168 Government forces consistently and
“systematically target civilians and civilian infrastructure, demonstrating the intent to kill,

164

Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Chemicals Used in Idlib Attacks,” April 13, 2015,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/13/syria-chemicals-used-idlib-attacks.
165

Human Rights Watch, “Syria,” https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/13/syria-chemicals-usedidlib-attacks.
166

Jett Goldsmith, “Chemical Crisis,” April 17, 2015,
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2015/04/27/chemical-crisis-a-timeline-of-cw-attacks-in-syriascivil-war/.
167

Human Rights Council, “Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic,” 16.
168

Human Rights Council, “Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic,” 16.

53

wound and maim.”169 The use of barrel bombs and heavy bombardments are intended to
soften opposition military positions as well as spread terror amongst the population. In
theory, either the civilians will leave the area or turn against the opposition to stop the
attacks. Either way, Assad gains more control and weakens the opposition by using
terrorist tactics.
Unlike the fighting in Syria, which features several instances of asymmetric
operations at the tactical and operational level, asymmetrical tactics are used at the
strategic level in Ukraine. Independent partisan organizations attack Ukrainian
infrastructure outside of the Donbas, but with the ultimate objective of destabilizing the
government in Kyiv. Russian special forces deployed to Crimea to secure key buildings
but operated in a more asymmetric than conventional manner.
There are two main sabotage groups that operate outside of the territory controlled
by the DNR and the LNR, one in the city of Kharkiv and another around the city of
Odesa. Both groups have launched bombing campaigns that largely target infrastructure
and buildings, but rarely people. Out of the two groups, the most vocal and active is the
one operating in Kharkiv. The Kharkiv Partisans, as they call themselves, have been
active since the fall of 2014. 170 According to media reports, the partisans are responsible
for over 40 bombings that have resulted in at least five deaths.171 In February 2015, the
group claimed responsibility for detonating a mine during a parade celebrating the
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anniversary of the Maidan that killed four people and the bombing of a local battalion
commander’s car that wounded the man and his wife. 172 Ukrainian security services
believe that the group is equipped and controlled by Russian special forces operating out
of Belgorod, Russia. 173 It is difficult to determine if the Kharkiv Partisans are indeed
under orders from the Russian military. However, their activities do target pro-Kyiv
organizations and ATO supporters.
The overall goal of the organization is to “liberate” the people of Kharkiv. In an
interview with Time, Filipp Ekozyants, a former wedding singer and spokesman for the
partisans, stated that the bombings in the city are conducted to weaken the authorities and
inspire residents to join the separatist movement. 174 The targets of the bombings are
mainly military and industrial installations in the city of Kharkiv and the surrounding
region.175 Ekozyants claims that his organization is part of the same network as the
separatists in Donetsk, and they are fighting for the same cause.176 His statement is
interesting because it implies that the DNR leadership is ordering the bombings. Whether
or not this is true, there is a reasonable chance that the Kharkiv Partisans are at least in
contact with the DNR and share the same eventual objective of reuniting Ukraine with
Russia.
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A group similar to the Kharkiv Partisans is believed to be operating in and around
the city of Odesa. Unlike in Kharkiv, there is no spokesman or video claims of
responsibility for bombings in the city. Between July 2014 and January 2015, there were
nine bombings, with seven taking place in December.177 Many of the attacks target the
offices of pro-Ukrainian organizations or volunteer battalion and typically occur at night
to avoid causing casualties.178 Other attacks have targeted railway lines and fuel
tankers.179 Ukrainian security officials claim that bombings are carried out by proRussian saboteurs to destabilize the country.180 The targets and modus operandi of the
incidents in Odesa share similar characteristics to those in Kharkiv. Both groups attempt
to avoid casualties and specifically target pro-Kyiv organizations or infrastructure.
Regular Russian soldiers have also conducted asymmetric operations in the
region. When unidentified gunmen appeared in Crimea in February 2014, Moscow
denied they were Russian soldiers. President Putin argued that the equipment carried by
the gunmen could be bought in a military surplus store.181 The men appeared to be
regular Russian soldiers without insignia and quickly received the nickname ‘little green
men’ by the Ukrainian military due to the color of their uniforms.182 A year after the
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annexation of Crimea, Putin admitted to ordering military forces into Crimea to returning
the peninsula to Russia in late February after Yanukovych fled the country.183 Within
days, Russian Spetsnaz (special forces) units deployed to Russia’s Black Sea Naval Base
in Sevastopol. 184 This admission directly conflicts with the initial statements by Putin
and the Kremlin following the referendum in Crimea.
Putin justified the deployment of soldiers to Crimea as a peacekeeping measure
rather than an invasion. According to Putin, the armed forces were sent to Crimea to
block Ukrainian soldiers stationed there “not for the purpose of forcing people to
participate in the vote… but to prevent bloodshed, and to allow people to express their
personal views on how they would like to see their own and their children’s future.”185
The soldiers deployed to Crimea were also visibly well-armed, which deterred Ukrainian
forces from moving against them.186 Sending heavily armed, but unidentified gunmen,
allowed Moscow to prevent the Ukrainian military from countering the pro-Russian
sections of the population. By the time the referendum was held, the peninsula was
largely under the control of Russian and pro-Russian fighters. At the time, Moscow was
able to deny direct involvement plausibly because the special forces soldiers lacked any
identifiable insignia.
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Creating Economic And Political Pressure To Support Military Operations
The incorporation of non-military tools, such as electronic or cyber operations,
information campaigns, and economic pressure is another characteristic of hybrid war.
Assad’s regime’s two main tools for exerting economic and political pressure on the
opposition are sieges and ceasefires. Sieges allow the government to target the economic
capabilities and public support centers of the opposition. Ceasefires provide the regime
with the ability to increase international pressure on opposition forces. The separatists in
Ukraine also benefit from internationally organized ceasefires, as well as advanced
electronic warfare and cyber capabilities. Political dynamics between Moscow and Kyiv
place additional stress on the Ukrainian government as it fights in the Donbas.
Sieges are a critical part of the regime’s campaign to put economic and political
pressure on the opposition. Within the context of the Syrian conflict, a siege is defined as
“when armed forces cut off access to a populated area, blocking the entry of food and
medicine and preventing the free movement of civilians into or out of the area, including
the evacuation of people in need of urgent medical care.”187 The regime is attempting to
reduce the opposition’s ability to fight by preventing necessary aid and food from being
sent into the suburbs. This fits within the third criteria of hybrid war, the use of nonmilitary capabilities like economic and political pressure. Extended sieges may reduce
popular support for the opposition in these areas and force the opposition to come to
terms for aid to be delivered to the suburbs.
According to PAX and the Syria Institute, two international organizations that
closely monitor and report on the besieged areas, there were more than one million
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Syrians in siege locations in Damascus, Rural Damascus, Homs, Deir Ezzor, and Idlib
provinces as of May 2016.188 Another 1.4 million people live in areas that are at risk of
becoming completely besieged by regime forces.189 One of the most recent sieges
occurred on July 7, 2016, Assad’s forces took critical ground outside the city of Aleppo,
and effectively besieged the opposition within Aleppo.190 Throughout the civil war,
regime forces have encircled enemy positions to prevent aid from entering opposition
strongholds and cutting any economic prospects to the cities.
International peace talks and ceasefires also provide the government with the
ability to put political pressure on opposition leaders. In 2016, the SAA announced a
unilateral ceasefire to celebrate Eid el-Fitr, the end of Ramadan.191 However,
international observers noted that regime forces continued to attack opposition positions.
In the last day of the alleged ceasefire, at least 50 people were killed by air strikes and
artillery bombardments.192 Assad can deny that his military is breaking the ceasefire, and
use any instances when the opposition fights back as an example of them not attempting
to work with the government to find a diplomatic solution.
Unlike the Syrian civil war, which typically focuses on military action, the
incorporation of non-military tools, such as electronic or cyber operations, information
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campaigns, and economic pressure, is a critical component of the fighting in Ukraine.
Political instability throughout the country provides Russia with the ability to put internal
and external political pressure on Kyiv. Ceasefires brokered by the international
community appear to benefit the separatists more than the ATO forces, and allows
Moscow to directly influence the politics in the Donbas.
The first ceasefire was called after the dynamics of the fighting in eastern Ukraine
significantly changed. In August 2014, ATO forces were rapidly advancing in separatist
territory, and by August 19, the DRN and LNR lost three-fourths of their originally
claimed territory, until the introduction of substantial Russian military equipment and
regular forces.193 An estimated 4,000 regular Russian soldiers crossed the border with
tanks and quickly halted the ATO advances. 194 Separatist forces, now bolstered by
Russian troops, forced the Ukrainian troops to retreat until a ceasefire was reached in
Minsk, Belarus on September 5, 2014.195 ATO forces may have been able to break the
separatist leaders’ will before the middle of August, but after the deployment of Russian
soldiers, the DNR and LRN solidified their positions.
Known as the Minsk Agreement, this ceasefire was not to last. In many areas,
such as around the Donetsk Airport, fighting did not slow down.196 The conflict would
escalate until February 2015 when another ceasefire brokered by France and Germany
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was signed once again in Minsk.197 Under the Minsk II agreement, separatists gained
control of an additional 500 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and assurances by
Kyiv that political steps would be taken to recognize the DNR and LNR.198 As of this
writing, the Minsk II agreement is still in effect but the political aspects have yet to be
implemented, and separatist territory has not significantly expanded.
Political pressure is put on Kyiv at the same time that Russian and separatist
forces are launching offensive operations in the Donbas. The first Minsk Agreement was
supposed to stop the fighting and allow discussions between Kyiv and the DNR and LNR
to take place. Instead, separatist offensive maneuvers increased, and Ukraine forces lost
ground while the ceasefire was supposed to be implemented. Separatist and Russian
forces seized even more territory during negotiations for the second Minsk Agreement.
Minsk II came into effect on February 15, 2015, but three days later separatist forces
seized Debaltseve.199 The ceasefires and political pressure prevented Kyiv from using its
full military capability to stop the offensive because the government did not want to
appear to be the first side to break the ceasefire.
Throughout the conflict in the Donbas, Ukrainian forces have noted significant
electronic warfare and cyber operations against its forces and the country’s infrastructure.
Electronic operations targeting Ukrainian military forces have occurred since the
annexation of Crimea. Once Russian forces started arriving in Crimea, Ukrainian soldiers
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reported being unable to use their radios and phones for hours at a time.200 Russian
electronic capabilities regularly block radar and GPS signals and disrupt command-andcontrol networks.201 These jamming capabilities reduce the Ukrainian forces’ ability to
launch effective counter-battery artillery fire and communicate during operations.
Electronic warfare capabilities usually support separatist assaults and provide an
additional advantage over the Ukrainian military.
Critical infrastructure within Ukraine has also been the target of cyber-attacks
during the conflict. The most significant event took place in the Ivano-Frankivsk region
in Western Ukraine on December 23, 2015.202 Unidentified hackers took control of the
power grid computer system and shut down 30 substations, cutting power to more than
230,000 residents in the middle of a cold winter.203 Ukrainian intelligence services
blamed Russia for the attack, but it remains unclear who is responsible for the incident.204
Regardless, the cyber operations are clearly anti-Kyiv and seek to further destabilize the
government while they are fighting the separatists.
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Complex, Not Hybrid, Conflicts In Syria And Ukraine
The conflicts in Syria and Ukraine have both been called hybrid wars, neither
fully fits within the established definitions of the concept. At times, there are some
regime operations in Syria that meet many of the qualifications for hybrid war, but
ultimately fail. Ukraine has few instances that meet the characteristics of the concept.
However, what these case studies do illustrate is the complexity of the conflicts and the
new challenges that they present.
Fighting in Damascus provides the best examples of the multifaceted operations
in Syria. Regular and unconventional forces all operate together, using conventional and
asymmetric tactics, to fight the opposition around the capital. Economic pressure is
applied to opposition-controlled areas through the use of sieges. All of these capabilities
are used around Damascus with the ultimate objective of regaining control of the suburbs
around the capital.
In the Damascus suburbs, the regime creates pressure on opposition forces by
launching “including highly destructive artillery bombardments and air raids.”205 Former
opposition fighters have switched allegiances to Assad, such as Jaysh al-Wafa (Loyalist
Army), created via the government’s “Reconciliation Committees.”206 Jaysh al-Wafa uses
insurgent and terrorist tactics when attacking opposition forces in Damascus and Eastern
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Ghouta.207 Instead of overextending the SAA forces tasked with protecting Assad, the
regime uses the militias to launch strikes against the opposition.
The fighting in Eastern Ghouta and Jobar demonstrates the regime’s ability to use
a variety of conventional and asymmetric capabilities within the same battle space. In
Eastern Ghouta, “the regime has also conducted a systematic effort to neutralize other
opposition-held neighborhoods through sieges, starvation,” and the use of chemical
weapons.208 Jobar is targeted by SAA heavy artillery, airstrikes, and ballistic missile
attacks on a daily basis, and “both sides have used ‘tunnel bomb’ attacks to burrow
explosives underneath opposing strongholds.”209 In many neighborhoods, the fighting is a
mix of indiscriminate bombing, urban warfare, and terrorist attacks conducted by the
SAA and its irregular allies.
Separatist operations in Eastern Ukraine include many of the characteristics of
hybrid war, but not all aspects are involved in every operation. The major engagements at
Ilovaisk and Debaltseve provide the best examples of hybrid war. At Debaltseve, the
irregular separatist forces were supported by conventional Russian armored units210 and
advanced electronic warfare capabilities211, to defeat the Ukrainian forces. However,
separatist operations in the Donbas do not feature many asymmetric tactics. This is a
critical component of hybrid warfare that is missing in many of the separatist operations.
Partisan groups in Kharkiv and Odesa provide the ability for separatists to launch
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asymmetric attacks, but so far they have not been in support of major operations in the
Donbas. While the separatists have not used many asymmetric tactics, they maintain
asymmetric capabilities that can be used in the future.
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PREPARING FOR FUTURE COMPLEX CONFLICTS

A New Type Of War
Military strategists from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz have viewed war as taking place
on a linear battlefield; hybrid war does not follow this prescription. There are numerous
factors that influence war and can provide advantages, but in the end, war was generally
seen as one armed force fighting another armed force. The type of an armed force can
range from a terrorist organization to a nation’s military, but the conflict itself is linear in
nature.
Hybrid warfare is more complex than using just an armed force to attack another
armed force. Irregular forces provide new ways to exploit the weaknesses of a
conventional force. Political, economic, and cyber capabilities provide non-military tools
allow one side to put additional pressures on an opponent. All of these different abilities
are applied at the same time, within the same battle space. Hybrid war allows the
advantages of each capability to be used while countering those enjoyed by the enemy.
Once the US military started to dominate the post-Cold War world, it is likely that
potential adversaries understood that it would be difficult and costly to take on the
American forces in a linear, conventional fight. Hybrid warfare is one way in which US
advantages can be countered and negated.
However, the usefulness of the concept to the policymaker is arguably limited.
There is still considerable debate among analysts, academics, and officials over what a
hybrid war even is. Hybrid war is conceptually new, but hybrid conflicts involve many of
the same issues that US policymakers and strategists have been facing throughout history.
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Even if a standard definition is established, it is unlikely that future conflicts will fit
within the established parameters.
The real usefulness of the hybrid war is how discussions of the concept have
illustrated the growing complexity of modern and future conflicts. Fighting in Syria and
Ukraine shows that the line between conventional and unconventional forces and
operations are becoming increasingly blurred. Future opponents are likely going to use a
number of political, economic, and cyber capabilities that the US has not had to face in
previous conflicts.

Lessons From The Wars In Syria And Ukraine
The Syrian and Ukrainian case studies provide examples of how war is becoming
more complex and the challenges that the US may experience in future conflicts. Each
conflict is unique and highlights how different capabilities can be used in new ways on
the battlefield. Integrated regular and irregular forces are being deployed into the same
battle space that use a variety of conventional and unconventional tactics.
Simultaneously, political and economic pressure is being applied overtly and covertly to
reduce the opponent’s ability counter the military forces on the ground. New cyber and
electronic warfare capabilities also provide a new tool that adds more complexity to the
conflict.
Both conflicts illustrate combined forces being used at the strategic, operational,
and tactical level. The Syrian Army has integrated irregular forces on all of its fronts, and
almost all operations use combined forces. Russian and separatist forces in Ukraine are
more focused on fighting together at the tactical and operational level than the strategic.
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The partisan groups provide the asymmetric capabilities, but they are not used outside of
the strategic level.
Fighting in Syria has unique characteristics that are different from what is seen in
Ukraine. In Syria, the conventional and irregular forces operate overtly and only make
limited attempts to hide information. Russia and Iran do attempt to limit how much
information is available regarding their troop deployments and how involved their
soldiers are, but neither country denies involvement in the war. Hezbollah, a USdesignated terrorist organization, openly fights alongside regime forces throughout the
country. The regime regularly launches conventional and asymmetric operations with the
SAA combined with irregular forces.
Pro-regime forces illustrated in Damascus, al-Qusayr, and Quneitra that combined
forces using different tactics, including terrorist attacks, can operate effectively. The use
of terrorism during military operations may occur in future conflicts and only makes the
battlefield more complex. Hybrid war requires military forces to have the resources to
effectively defend against several different types of conflict, all at the same time. In
future conflicts, US forces may have to be able to conduct conventional and counterterrorist operations at the same to counter a hybrid threat.
The fighting in Ukraine is an example of complex conflict that emphasizes covert
conventional forces and capabilities. Unlike in Syria, Russia categorically denies any
direct military involvement in the Donbas. Moscow insists that it has not deployed any
regular forces across the border and that the separatists are operating on their own. This
ambiguity limits how much support the US can provide to the government in Kyiv
because Russia can continue to provide covert support without the US being able to
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respond in kind. Ukrainian forces have to fight against irregular separatists backed by
Russian armored units and advanced military capabilities. Major separatist victories all
occurred with significant support from the regular, conventional Russian military. US
forces in the future may become engaged in a similar situation where the main
conventional enemy is working with irregular forces, but covertly, and an escalation of
force may not be possible without potentially starting an even larger conflict.
Electronic warfare is becoming more advanced and can significantly reduce
technological advantages in future wars. Jamming technology in Ukraine shut down
military communication networks and prevented effective counter-battery fire during
separatist maneuvers. The US military relies on digital communications and has not faced
an enemy in recent conflicts with effective electronic warfare capabilities. In the future,
this may not be the case, and the US and its allies need to be prepared to fight in an
environment with limited or no digital communications.
Cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructure may also occur in the future. The
attack in Ukraine that shut down the power grid did not occur at the tactical level in
Donbas, but at the strategic level, and proves that infrastructure is vulnerable to cyber
operations. Future hybrid operations may include a cyber-attack that shuts down critical
systems before, or during, an attack at the tactical and operational levels. Cyber-attacks
could be like the one in Ukraine, where power is cut to a large segment of the population,
causing the government to divert resources and time to fixing the damage from where the
main hybrid operation is.
Ukraine’s cyber-attack also illustrates how difficult it is to attribute responsibility
for cyber operations. It is possible that Russia was behind the attack, and it would make
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sense given the current situation in the Donbas, but so far the perpetrator(s) of the attack
have yet to be identified. During a hybrid war, cyber-attacks could target the US without
Washington being able to respond because the attacker is unable to be identified.
The Syrian and Ukraine case studies both show complex the security environment
is in modern conflicts. Fighting in these increasingly tangled conflicts requires the ability
to counter conventional and asymmetrical capabilities at the same time in the same battle
space. However, military operations are only one facet of war. Controlling information at
the local and international level is a critical component of complex conflicts. Recent
counter-insurgency experiences in the Middle East have illustrated how important it is for
the military to gain the trust of the people by countering the propaganda of insurgents and
terrorist groups. Adversaries will try to control the narrative of the conflict, and the US
needs to be able to counter an opponent's propaganda campaign effectively. If the US and
its allies fail to conduct information operations, they risk losing international credibility
and the support of the local population.
Extensive economic capabilities are not used throughout the Syrian and Ukrainian
case studies but are another potential challenges in the future. The regime in Syria uses
sieges to stifle the local economies in the Damascus suburbs, but it is a relatively limited
campaign. These sieges affect the opposition at the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels by limiting their ability to sustain their units in the area and could reduce local
support. Future wars could involve extensive attacks on the economic base of the US or
its allies. Economic pressure might come in the form of trade blockades or other acts, like
a cyber-attack on financial infrastructure. Isolated economic attacks are a real risk, but if
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conducted at the same time during a military operation, it would create additional stress
for the government and the armed forces.

Countering US Advantages With Multiple Capabilities
The US has had to face many of the same challenges that are high lightened in
Syria and Ukraine throughout history. What separates potential future conflicts from the
past is the combination of all of these threats occurring at the same time. The growing
complexity creates a significantly more challenging security environment that will
require extensive resources and flexibility to counter each threat effectively. Many of the
current US advantages are at risk in this type of battle space, and US military forces will
need to be able to adapt should it lose advantages in technology and conventional
capabilities.
In the current post-Cold War security environment, the US has enjoyed a
significant advantage in technology and information systems over any adversary, but
utilizing diverse and complex strategies allows an opponent to counter those advantages
and exploit their weaknesses. Few countries can achieve parity with the American
military’s advanced weapon systems, technical capabilities, and extensive resources.
However, the current US military superiority may not be the most effective at countering
complex threats.
US forces are focusing on organizing, equipping, and planning for future conflicts
based on advanced air systems, digital information systems, and reduced ground forces.
Hybrid war allows an enemy to use conventional forces and tactics to counter US
technical advantages. Electronic warfare can disrupt or disable the extensive information
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and space-based systems that US technology depend on to effectively operate. Command,
control, and communication capabilities all need digital networks, and future enemies can
target the networks to negate those advantages.
Conventional US military forces have been able to dominate the tactical
battlefield in recent conflicts. However, as US land forces are reduced, they may become
less effective in the new complex environment. Opponents are likely to employ forces
that formed from integrated regular and irregular soldiers, allowing them more options to
meet various conditions on the battlefield. Fewer ground units limit how much territory
can be physically held, which is essential when fighting insurgencies or groups
conducting terrorist attacks, tactics that are likely to be used during in future wars. US
land forces need to be able to deploy against the enemy’s conventional and irregular units
at the same time.
The American conventional military dominance has also limited the exposure of
US soldiers to experiences such as drone strikes, massed artillery fire, and massed tank
formations. In future conflicts, it is likely that the enemy will possess advanced
unmanned platforms that can launch precision-guided munitions or provide intelligence,
reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities. At least within the past decade, US forces
have not fought an opponent that can field large tank formations supported by artillery
and aircraft. American units have not had to face comparative advanced conventional
capabilities on the battlefield for some time and lack the firsthand experience of being
under massed indirect fire or being targeted by precision munitions.
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Fighting In A Complex Environment
In future conflicts, there is a possibility that the US will face an opponent that
utilizes complex or hybrid operations. US military officials, as previously discussed at the
beginning of this thesis, have acknowledged that there is an increasing probability the US
will be involved in a hybrid conflict. Certain actions can be taken by policymakers to
prepare American forces to fight in a complex security environment.
Winning The Information War. The current US technical abilities, based on
space and information systems, provides the American military with unparalleled
advanced capabilities. However, if those systems are disabled or disrupted, US forces
need to be prepared to fight without access to the weapons and communications that run
on the space-based platform. In a hybrid war, the enemy will likely be able to reduce at
least some of the advanced capabilities using electronic warfare or cyber-attacks.
Maintaining extensive IRS capabilities will assist US forces in identifying the
different components of each criterion of hybrid war. It is critical to understand the
conventional and irregular forces of the enemy, what their capabilities are, and how they
will operate. Some enemies may focus more on conventional units while others may use
more irregular forces and asymmetric tactics. Understanding how the opponent plans to
fight is critical in hybrid war so the appropriate US forces can be deployed to counter
each threat.
Special operational forces (SOF) with experience fighting in complex
environments can provide critical IRS capabilities. In a report released by West Point’s
Modern War Institute, Captain John Chambers argues that US SOF are “essential in
providing understanding of the human terrain” and are “able to engage early, understand
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what is happening, and identify options to shape, deter, and influence actors in the gray
zone.”212 SOF units were effectively deployed to northern Afghanistan to work with the
Northern Alliance to fight the Taliban and to northern Iraq in 2003 to coordinate with the
Kurds. Chambers notes that the Special Operations Command is already working on reestablishing units that focus specifically on unconventional warfare and have been
operating in anti-IS operations in Syria.213 Maintaining SOF units that are trained to
operate in complex environments rather than just in a counter terrorism or stability
capacity will provide useful options of the US in the future.
The US can also utilize current defensive alliances such as NATO to improve its
intelligence gathering operations. Intelligence sharing among NATO members exists, but
current mechanisms do not provide quick and efficient exchanges of domestic
intelligence. A general report released by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 2015
highlighted the challenges in information sharing and called for creating “a point of
access to each member state’s domestic intelligence agencies.”214 The report also called
for increasing cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence organizations which
will “allow member states to better address a range of transnational security threats and
shared issues.”215 Creating regional intelligence sharing centers throughout NATO states
could improve intelligence capabilities and cooperation.216
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Ambiguous operations are one of the most significant challenges in the complex
environment, such as the Russian deployments into Ukraine. Having an efficient and
connected network of local sources across Europe could provide a type of warning
system that alerts NATO to possible political or social situations that are conducive to
manipulation from outside sources. If a conflict has already begun, the intelligence
sharing centers could deliver the information necessary to counter covert support or
operations. However, this system would likely only be effective in NATO spheres of
influence. Complex environments are to be expected throughout the world, not just in
Europe. Policymakers could consider increasing intelligence cooperation with allies
outside of NATO.
The conflicts in Syria and Ukraine have also demonstrated the importance of
strategic communications and information dissemination. Russian media portrays the
separatist conflict as an oppressed section of Ukrainian society being unjustly attacked by
the government. Kyiv is typically labeled as fascist or neo-Nazi and local grievances are
specifically targeted by the media. The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of
Excellence noted in 2016 report that social media was being used to “create confusion
about the events in Ukraine” and “diminish the value of the truth.”217 Social media and
other information services can be used to disrupt messaging and spread alternative
narratives that limit options for the US.
Developing and maintaining effective strategic communications capabilities
would be useful in countering the opponent’s narrative and propaganda. NATO has
created the Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia to improve
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information operations, but according to the Parliamentary Assembly reports, it does not
fully coordinate strategic communications across the “Alliance, regional, and individual
member state level.”218 Similar to the intelligence network, focusing on improving
coordinate between all member states could strengthen the entire alliance and provide a
more effective counter to the adversary’s messaging.
Creating Flexible Forces And Utilizing Alliances. The conflicts in Ukraine and
Syria have shown that states are able to deploy various types of units and operate in
different ways, from a conventional offensive to terrorist attacks. Extensive ground forces
are necessary to be able to meet any enemy formation that is used in a future conflict.
Each future conflict will be unique and require a flexible force to counter a variety of
threats. Reducing the number of ground forces hinders the ability of the US military to
adapt and be effective in a complex environment.
US forces need to be able to quickly deploy into a variety of environments and be
capable of engaging conventional and irregular forces. This is not a new challenge for the
US military or its allies, and forward deploying units has historically been the solution.
Forward deployments remain a useful tool and could reduce escalation in potential
conflict zones. Chambers argues that that pre-positioning forces in at risk countries
increases the risk for a potential aggressor to become directly engaged with US forces
and reduces ambiguity.219 During the Cold War, the US had static bases in Western
Europe as a deterrent and to provide a force that could be quickly deployed. The rising
tensions with Russia have convinced Eastern European allies to allow US forces to
rotationally deploy into their country. Norway announced on October 24, 2016 that it
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would allow US troops to be stationed at the Vaernes military base throughout 2017, and
potentially into the future.220
Similar rotational deployments can be used by the US in the future to bolster
allies and partners that are at risk to incursions. These forward deployed forces can train
and work together with the host nation to better understand the security environment and
conditions on the ground. Even if the US troops fail to deter an adversary from becoming
more aggressive or conducting operations, they can be in a position to quickly react and
adapt to the situation.
However, the US will not always be able to station forces in all situations.
Forward deployments are expensive and cost restraints can limit resources or the political
environment in the potential host country prevents direct deployments. Once a country is
designated as at risk of becoming involved in a complex environment, the military could
create an advance campaign already staffed and approved by the necessary authorities in
both the US and the host country that can be quickly put into action.221 Advance planning
would reduce the amount of time it takes for the US to mobilize its forces and provide a
clear outline of what the US forces will do once they are deployed. Confusion and
ambiguity are significant challenges in the complex environment and pre-planned
campaign could reduce some of the uncertainty.
It will not always be clear when a country is at risk of becoming involved in a
conflict and advancing planning may not always be in place. Creating units that are
specifically trained and equipped to be rapidly deployed into a complex environment
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would provide policymakers with the ability to quickly react to unexpected conflicts.
Following the Russian involvement in Ukraine, NATO created the Very High Readiness
Joint Task Force (VJTF), which “will shorten the time necessary to bring significant
firepower to any corner of the Alliance to deter and defend any member state.”222 One of
the shortcomings of the VJTF is that it is only focused on military operations. The US
should continue to invest in the VJTF and could create its own independent versions that
are prepared to deploy into regions outside of NATO. If able, the US could create
different regional joint task forces with partners and allies in Africa, Asia, and the
Americas based on the VJTF.
Rapid reaction forces in a complex environment need to be capable of countering
not just the adversary’s military capabilities, but their political, economic, and
informational capacity as well. This will require improving and building cooperation
between the various government offices outside of the Department of Defense, including
the State Department, the Intelligence Community, and other necessary departments. The
State Department can integrate civil affairs officers into the force to provide political
support and advice. Chambers offers a similar solution if soldiers are able to be forward
deployed into a host country.223 Complex conflicts require more than just military forces,
and US troops need the support of non-military capabilities.
The US is likely to be engaged in a complex conflict in the future, and the
military should prepare to fight in an environment without its current technological
advantages. Not all conflicts in the future will by complex, but the trends in Syria and
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Ukraine suggest that hybrid operations are effective and can counter America’s
conventional dominance. Failing to prepare for this type of security environment
increases the risk that the US will be unable to effectively counter new security threats
and challenges in the future.
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